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Abstract
We use proprietary transaction data on interest rate swaps to assess the effects
of centralized trading, as mandated by Dodd–Frank, on market quality.
Contracts with the most extensive centralized trading see liquidity metrics
improve by between 12% and 19% relative to those of a control group. This is
driven by a clear increase in competition between dealers, particularly in U.S.
markets. Additionally, centralized trading has caused interdealer trading in
EUR swap markets to migrate from the United States to Europe. This is
consistent with swap dealers attempting to avoid being captured by the trade
mandate in order to maintain market power.
Keywords : Interest Rate Swaps; Pre-trade Transparency; Market Power;
Liquidity; Swap Execution Facilities
JEL Classification: G10, G12, G14.
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I. Introduction
A key regulatory response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis has been to improve
the resilience and transparency of over-the-counter (OTC) markets for derivative contracts.
To this end, over the last decade these markets have seen the introduction of clearing and
margining and also increases in pre- and post-trade transparency, via centralized trading
requirements and the creation of repositories containing information on completed trades.
This study focusses on a particular aspect of this regulatory change, an increase in
pre-trade transparency in OTC markets, and we investigate how this has affected the
competitive structure and liquidity of interest rate swap (IRS) markets. The global swap
market is by far the largest OTC derivatives market (see Bank for International
Settlements (2016)), and this is the first study of the impact of post-crisis regulation on
that market. Historically, global swap trading was decentralized and relatively opaque.
However, a centralized trading requirement was introduced in the United States in 2014 via
the “Dodd–Frank Act”, which required that any trade in a sufficiently liquid IRS contract
involving a U.S. counterparty must take place on a swap execution facility (SEF). SEFs are
multilateral trading venues, featuring open limit order book (LOB) and request for quote
(RFQ) functionalities, allowing customers to solicit quotes from multiple dealers and/or an
order book simultaneously. Thus, SEFs introduced pre-trade transparency to a previously
dark market and reduced customers’ costs of searching for liquidity.
We show that the introduction of SEF trading had several important effects on IRS
markets. First, the evidence in our paper points to improvements in liquidity for swaps
that were subject to the SEF trading mandate. Relative to EUR mandated swaps (where
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SEF trading is much less prevalent), all liquidity metrics for USD mandated swaps improve
significantly. For example, price dispersion (used here as measure of liquidity) drops by
12%–19%, which translates to daily execution costs for end-investors in USD mandated
swaps falling by about $3–$6 million relative to those in EUR mandated swaps. When
comparing mandated with non-mandated USD swaps, the results are slightly weaker with
the relative improvement between these two groups being significant for most but not all
liquidity metrics. However, given that liquidity improves overall for all USD contracts (i.e.,
mandated and non-mandated ones), we argue that this is likely driven by spillover effects
from mandated to non-mandated contracts.
Second, we show that this improvement in liquidity is linked to more intense
competition between swap dealers. Following the introduction of the SEF trading mandate,
the number of active swap traders rose and we show that active U.S. clients (i.e., those
clients most strongly affected by the regulation) traded with a significantly larger number
of dealers after the trade mandate.
Finally, we show that the introduction of centralized trading in the United States
led to the global EUR swap market fragmenting geographically, as the percentage of
average daily trading volume between U.S. and non-U.S. domiciled dealers in EUR swaps
declined abruptly from 20% to 5%. This decline in trans-Atlantic volume for EUR contracts
was entirely driven by swap dealers with trading desks in multiple locations shifting the
bulk of their interdealer activity to their non-U.S. (primarily European) branches.1 This is
consistent with EUR swap dealers trying to retain market power by blocking access to the
1For related press coverage, see also “Big U.S. Banks Make Swaps a Foreign Affair” in the Wall St.
Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579520302570888332).
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interdealer market to potential entrants. This is because, by transferring activity outside of
the scope of U.S. rules and avoiding SEF trading, dealers retain the ability to exclude
specific counterparties, something that is not possible (or easy) under the trade mandate.
No similar pattern exists for trades between dealers and clients or trades in USD swaps.2
Our analysis uses proprietary data from the London Clearing House (LCH),
supplemented with public data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
(DTCC), for the period between Jan. 2013 and Sept. 2014. SEF trading was introduced to
the United States in October 2013 and SEF trading became mandatory for a set of
contracts in February 2014. Thus, our data cover the trading activity in the Global IRS
market for a reasonable period before and after the regulatory change. Both data sources
contain standard information on swap transactions. The LCH data additionally contain
counterparty information from which we can infer traders’ geographic locations and
whether a trader is a dealer or a client. The DTCC data on the other hand indicate
whether a trade was executed on a SEF.
We estimate a difference-in-differences model to isolate the effects of the
introduction of SEF trading on liquidity, activity and competition. The treatment group in
our analysis is the set of USD swaps that were required to trade on a SEF after Feb. 2014.
Our control group is either the EUR swaps that were mandated, but which are mostly
traded by non-U.S. persons who are not captured by the SEF trading requirement, or the
USD swaps that were not captured by the SEF trading mandate. We measure liquidity
using various price dispersion measures based on the metric proposed by Jankowitsch,
2The USD market is dominated by U.S. persons who are subject to the trade mandate and as such,
migrating its entire interdealer segment outside the United States would likely be impractical.
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Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2011), plus Amihud’s price impact measure (Amihud
(2002)) and a bid–ask spread derived from swap quote data.
This difference-in-differences setup is not without issues. First, the allocation of
swaps to the treatment group is not exogenous. SEFs determine which swaps to trade and
do so on the basis of liquidity. Second, the control groups have some limitations. For
example, if SEF trading affects the liquidity of a mandated USD swap there may be
spillovers to non-mandated USD swaps that are nearby on the maturity curve. We discuss
these issues further in Section IV and argue that they are unlikely to overturn our main
results.
To place our analysis within the context of recent theory work on transparency, our
result that centralized trading has improved liquidity and increased dealer competition for
mandated swaps lends support to the research of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2005) and
Yin (2005). These authors argue that pre-trade quote transparency is a necessary condition
for competitive liquidity provision and lower transaction costs for customers since it
reduces search frictions. Foucault, Pagano and Ro¨ell (2013) argue that in the presence of
positive search costs, a unique Nash equilibrium exists where dealers quote monopolist
prices (i.e., prices that equal end-users’ reservation values). Thus, reducing search costs
allows customers to access keener pricing.3 Hendershott and Madhavan (2015) examine
how electronic venues may facilitate trading in OTC markets. They show that periodic
one-sided electronic auctions, similar to the RFQ mechanism we see on SEFs, encourage
3Vayanos and Wang (2012) survey the literature and explain how illiquidity is related to various
market imperfections. They show that participation costs, imperfect competition and search frictions all
have a detrimental effect on liquidity.
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dealer competition and result in better prices while limiting information leakage. Our
results run counter to the intuition in de Frutos and Manzano (2002) and Foucault, Moinas
and Theissen (2007). The former argue that risk-averse dealers price less keenly in
transparent markets, since, to induce trades that correct an inventory imbalance, they only
need to marginally improve the quote on the relevant side of the market relative to their
competitors. Foucault et al. (2007) show that when informed trading intensities are low,
lower transparency (in the form of hiding trader identity information) can lead to higher
liquidity.
Empirical work on the link between transparency and liquidity contains mixed
results. Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005) show that liquidity of NYSE stocks increased
significantly when the exchange began to publish the limit order book to traders not
located on the exchange floor. Green, Hollifield and Schu¨rhoff (2006) study municipal bond
dealers. They argue that opacity in this market increases dealer market power and they
show how market power increases execution costs. Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007),
Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), and Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman
(2006) show that introducing post-trade transparency to U.S. corporate bond markets had,
on balance, a positive effect on liquidity (with exceptions for thinly-traded bonds and for
the largest trades).4 In contrast, Foucault et al. (2007) show that imposing anonymity on
trading activity, that is reducing transparency, increased liquidity in Euronext stock
trading. Friederich and Payne (2014) find the same result in data from the London Stock
Exchange, attributing it to the possibility of predatory trading under transparency (i.e.,
4Other evidence that links transparency with liquidity can also found in Harris and Piwowar (2006)
and Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan (1999).
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when identities are revealed). Our results chime with those that suggest a positive link
between transparency and liquidity.5
Our work is also related to other recent studies focusing on regulatory developments
in OTC derivative markets.6 Loon and Zhong (2014) and Loon and Zhong (2016) study the
effects of centralized clearing and post-trade reporting on CDS markets. Both of these
reforms, mandated by Dodd–Frank, are shown to improve liquidity, while the former also
reduces credit risk. Our focus is different, in that we study the impact of pre-trade
transparency as related to the third pillar of the Dodd–Frank OTC derivatives regulation
(i.e., the mandate for centralized trading) and we also examine the IRS market, which is
much larger than the CDS market.7
Our result that EUR swap markets have fragmented due to the U.S. SEF trading
mandate ties into a recent regulatory literature on the efficacy and impact of the reform
(see Giancarlo (2015), Massad (2016), and Powell (2016)). The result suggests that there
are costs, pecuniary or otherwise, to trading on SEFs that dealers wish to avoid. As
mentioned earlier, one possibility is that dealers move activity from their U.S. desks to
their European desks in order to retain control over who they deal with. This could allow
them to exclude new entrants from the interdealer EUR swap market which, in turn, would
5Our results are also in line with the experimental evidence in Flood, Huisman, Koedijk and Mahieu
(1999).
6See Spatt (2017) and Acharya, Engle, Figlewski, Lynch and Subrahmanyam (2009) for an overview of
the post-crisis derivatives reform agenda.
7It is worth noting that Loon and Zhong (2016) include a SEF dummy variable in their panel
regressions but as their sample period ends before the introduction of the CFTC trading mandate, in
February 2014, their study does not assess the impact of the trading mandate on liquidity.
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preclude those new entrants from trading effectively in the client market.8 Thus, the
geographic fragmentation we observe is consistent with dealers attempting to maintain
entry barriers to (EUR) swap trading.
Overall, our analysis highlights the importance of dealer market power in
understanding how financial markets react to changes in transparency. This remains an
area of policy interest. In Jan. 2018 Europe adopted new centralized trading rules for swaps
as part of the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR). This has the
potential to improve conditions for customers and also to remove the imbalance in
regulation that has led to the geographical fracture in swaps markets. At the same time, in
the U.S., there is uncertainty as to whether all parts of the Dodd–Frank Act will be
retained as law with the new CFTC trading rules being at the heart of this discussion
among policy makers and practitioners.9
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II sets out the regulatory changes that
affected swap markets as a result of Dodd–Frank and gives a detailed description of SEFs.
Section III describes our data sources and presents summary statistics. Section IV presents
the difference-in-differences tests of the impact of the SEF trading mandate on market
activity and liquidity. Section V shows how the mandate has changed the relationships
between dealers and customers. It also describes the changes in the geography of swap
trading and how those changes may be linked to market power. Section VI concludes.
8This would not be feasible for USD swaps as the interdealer market is well established, geographically,
in the U.S., while the bulk of EUR swap trading already happens in Europe.
9See, for example, related reporting by Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/
2017-02-23/wall-street-girds-for-regulatory-battles-loud-and-quiet
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II. Policy Context and Institutional Details
A. OTC Derivatives and the Dodd–Frank Act
A major pillar of the U.S. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
“Dodd–Frank Act”) concerns OTC derivatives markets. Owing to concerns that insufficient
collateralization and opacity in these markets contributed to systemic risk during the crisis,
the Act implemented reforms aimed at reducing counterparty risk and improving
transparency in swaps markets. It mandates centralized clearing for eligible contracts,
requires real-time reporting and public dissemination of transactions and also requires that
eligible contracts should be traded on a SEF, a type of multilateral electronic trading
venue. SEF trading markedly increases the level of pre-trade transparency for affected swap
contracts.
The CFTC implemented the Dodd–Frank trading mandate in two phases. First, on
Oct. 2, 2013, SEF trading became available for OTC derivatives on a voluntary basis. As of
that date, newly authorized trading venues had to comply with a number of principles and
requirements. One of these requirements was the obligation to operate a LOB.10
Subsequently, specific contracts were explicitly required to be executed on SEFs. The
10This does not mean that there were no electronic venues for swap trading before Oct. 2, 2013. It means
that after this date, any venue that was officially recognized as a SEF had to comply with the specific
CFTC minimum requirements mentioned above. Unfortunately, we have no data on swap trading prior to
Oct. 2, 2013. Nevertheless, if swaps were already being traded on pre-trade transparent electronic platforms
before this date, this should bias us against finding any differences in market conditions when making a
“before versus after” comparison. Our analysis shows that the differences were actually substantial.
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mandate captured IRS contracts of various currencies and maturities as well as several
credit default swap (CDS) indices. The decision as to which swaps were to be SEF-traded
was in the hands of the SEFs themselves, through the made available to trade (MAT)
procedure. A SEF can submit a determination that a swap is available for trade to the
CFTC, which then reviews the submission. Once a swap is certified as available to trade,
all other SEFs that offer this swap for trading must do so in accordance with the
requirements of the trade mandate. The criteria for MAT determination include the
trading volume of the swap and the frequency of transactions. Table 1 shows the mandated
maturities along with the mandate date for the plain vanilla USD- and EUR-denominated
IRS contracts which we study. Most maturities were mandated on February 15, 2014 with a
couple more following a few days later on the 26th.
[TABLE 1]
The SEF trading mandate only captures “U.S. persons,” with that definition being
relatively broad.11 Importantly, the mandate affects the trades of U.S. persons regardless of
who their counterparty is. In other words, if a U.S. person is to trade a mandated contract
with a non-U.S. person, the trade has to be executed on a SEF.
11Apart from U.S.-registered swap dealers and major participants, the definition of a U.S. person also
includes foreign entities that carry guarantees from a U.S. person (e.g., the foreign branch of a U.S. dealer)
and also any entities with personnel on U.S. soil which is substantially involved in arranging, negotiating or
executing a transaction. According to market reports this created initially some uncertainty as to who is
captured. See for example: http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2256600/
broader-us-person-definition-could-cause-clearing-avalanche-participants-warn
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B. SEF Characteristics
SEFs are electronic trading platforms where, according to the CFTC, “multiple
participants have the ability to execute swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple
participants in the platform.” In practice, SEFs accomplish this using two different trading
mechanisms. The first is a standard central limit order book. All SEFs must offer an order
book and, theoretically, this functionality allows end-users to bypass dealers altogether in
concluding a trade, assuming of course that the order book has sufficient liquidity.
The second functionality is a RFQ mechanism. While this operates similarly to
pre-existing single-dealer RFQ platforms, the innovation is that a client’s request for a
quote must be disseminated simultaneously and instantly to multiple dealers instead of just
one. Thus, clients can easily compare prices across dealers and competition between dealers
for client order flow intensifies. Until October 2014, the law required that a RFQ be
communicated to at least two dealers and, subsequently, to no less than three. Having
received a RFQ, dealers respond by posting their quotes to the client.12 Importantly,
dealers cannot see each others’ quotes nor do they know which other dealers have received
the request. In addition, those responding to the RFQ cannot be affiliated with the RFQ
requester and may not be affiliated with each other. This arrangement makes collusion
between dealers difficult and effectively renders the bidding process a first-price, sealed bid
auction.
12It is worth noting that, due to concerns about information leakage of future trading intentions, the
CFTC did not require that the identity of the RFQ requester be disclosed. See Foucault et al. (2007) and
Nolte, Payne and Vasios (2015) for a discussion on the implications of the disclosure of counterparty IDs.
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The two trading functionalities are designed to operate in conjunction for mandated
swaps.13 Practically, a SEF must provide a RFQ requester with any resting bid or offer on
the order book alongside any quotes received by the dealers from whom quotes have been
requested. The requester has the discretion to execute either against the LOB quotes or
against the RFQ responses.14 After a LOB or RFQ trade, the SEF can establish a short
work-up session open to all market participants. During the work-up, market participants
can trade an additional quantity of the same swap at the same price as the initial trade,
with first priority in execution given to counterparties who initiated the first trade.15
Many SEFs trade the swaps that we study. Data from LCH for April to September
2014 show that for USD swaps the most active SEFs were Tradeweb (with a market share
of 20.6%), ICAP (19.8%), Tullet Prebon (17.2%) and Bloomberg (15%). Total USD trading
activity for this period was $4,770bn. ICAP had the largest market share in EUR trading
(at 34.8%), followed by BGC Partners (25.0%), Tullet Prebon (15.0%) and Tradeweb
(10.6%). Total trading volume in the EUR contracts was e4,444bn. In both cases, no other
SEF had a market share above 10%. Thus, some of the most active SEFs are operated by
brokers, while others are run by specialist information and trading systems firms. We have
no data on the fraction of SEF trading in IRS occurring on order books versus RFQ, but
13Any trades of swap contracts that are not subject to the mandate can still be executed on a SEF and
the SEF must offer an order book. However, the SEF is also free to offer any other method of execution
(including bilateral trading and voice-based systems) for these trades.
14Collin-Dufresne, Junge and Trolle (2016) analyze SEF trading of index CDS and show that most
dealer-to-customer trades are done via RFQ, while interdealer trades use several different execution
mechanisms.
15Duffie and Zhu (2017) show that work-up protocols can enhance price discovery and liquidity.
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Riggs, Onur, Reiffen and Zhu (2018) show that LOB usage is limited in SEF trading of
index CDS.
Overall, SEFs change the microstructure of the market in two important ways.
First, they increase pre-trade transparency by allowing market participants to observe
prices quoted by dealers much more easily. Second, SEFs increase competition between
swap liquidity suppliers. They make comparison of dealer quotes straightforward, they
allow new entrants to start supplying liquidity on LOBs, and they allow end-users to trade
directly with each other and to bypass dealers completely.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
A. Swap Transaction Data
We use transaction data for USD and EUR denominated vanilla spot interest rate
swaps, which we obtain from LCH and DTCC. LCH clears approximately 50% of the
global interest rate swap market and more than 90% of cleared interest rate swaps through
its SwapClear platform. Its services are used by all major dealers. We obtain reports of all
new trades that were cleared by LCH between Jan. 1, 2013 and Sept. 15, 2014.
Each LCH report contains the trade date, effective date, maturity date, notional,
swap rate, and other contract characteristics. It also includes counterparty identities, which
allows us to categorize trades by type of counterparty (dealer vs. non-dealer) and location
(U.S., EU etc). As is standard in this market, we classify the top 16 banks by volume in
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our sample as dealers, while any other counterparty is classified as a client.16 Since Apr.
2014 LCH reports also contain information on whether a transaction is executed on a
trading venue, the name of the venue, as well as whether the venue is authorized as a SEF.
We apply a number of filters to clean the data. First, we remove duplicate reports,
which arise because one report is generated for each side of a cleared trade. Then we keep
only spot starting swaps, while removing portfolio and compression trades as they are not
price-forming.17 Finally, we filter inaccurate and false reports, defined as those where the
percentage difference between the reported swap rate and Bloomberg’s end-of-day rate for
the same currency and maturity is more than 5% in absolute value.
Although LCH is the global leader in IRS clearing, there are other clearing houses
that offer competing services (e.g., the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)). To ensure
that our results are representative of the entire market, we complement the LCH data with
data from DTCC, a trade repository (TR) operator. We extract all transactions that were
reported to them between Jan. 1, 2013 and Sept. 15, 2014. We filter the DTCC data in a
similar way to the LCH data and we remove any trades that were reported to both LCH
and DTCC via an algorithm that matches LCH and DTCC reports based on contract
characteristics that are common to both data sets.
16This choice is not arbitrary as these 16 banks are classified as “Participating Dealers” in the OTC
Derivatives Supervisors Group, chaired by the New York Fed:
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html
17Compression trades are used in order to reduce the total notional amounts outstanding of
participating institutions, while leaving their net notional amounts unchanged. The purpose of this is to
manage counterparty exposures while maintaining the same level of exposure to market risk.
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[FIGURE 1]
After filtering the data, we are left with a sample of 628,896 trade reports which
account for a total $58.17 trillion in notional. In Figure 1 we show the time series of
trading volume by currency. This figure illustrates the sheer size of the swap market with
volumes around $70–$80 billion for each currency on a daily basis. We can also see that
total volume is roughly equally split between USD and EUR denominated swaps.
[FIGURE 2]
Graph A of Figure 2 displays volume shares by counterparty type. The majority of
trades are interdealer, consistent with the commonly held view that a small group of dealers
dominates the swap market. Dealer-to-client trades account for about one-third of volume
in both currencies. One difference between currencies is that the share of client-to-client
activity is twice as large for USD-denominated swaps than it is for EUR swaps.
With regard to location, we split trading activity into i) trades between U.S.
financial institutions, ii) trades between U.S. and non-U.S. financial institutions, and
iii) trades between non-U.S. financial institutions. Graph B of Figure 2 presents these data.
About 50% of trading in USD-denominated swaps involves a U.S. and a non-U.S.
counterparty, 30% two U.S. counterparties, and 20% two non-U.S. counterparties. For
EUR-denominated swaps, U.S. to non-U.S. trading activity is only 14% of the sample, with
the vast majority of trades, about 80%, between non-U.S. counterparties. This means that
the SEF trading mandate has little bite in EUR swap markets, as they are dominated by
non-U.S. counterparties. This observation motivates part of our empirical strategy.
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IV. SEF Trading and Market Quality
A. Liquidity Variables
We measure liquidity with five metrics that are built from transaction data or
intraday bid–ask quotes provided by Thomson Reuters. One limitation of the trade reports
is that they are not time-stamped and so we cannot construct metrics that rely on
transaction sequencing. Instead, we mainly use metrics that only require executed trades
and bid–ask quotes.
Our first three liquidity metrics are based on price dispersion. These measures are
estimates of the relative effective spread and as such we use them to measure execution
costs. The first is that proposed by Jankowitsch et al. (2011):
(1) DISP JNSi,t =
√√√√Ni,t∑
k=1
VLMk,i,t
VLMi,t
(
Pk,i,t −mi,t
mi,t
)2
,
where Ni,t is the number of trades executed for contract i on day t, mi,t is Bloomberg’s
end-of-day t mid-quote for contract i, Pk,i,t is the execution price of transaction k, VLMk,i,t
is the volume of transaction k and VLMi,t =
∑
k VLMk,i,t is the total volume for contract i
on day t. Jankowitsch et al. (2011) derive this measure from a microstructure model where
it is shown to capture inventory and search costs. Low price dispersion around the
benchmark indicates low trading costs and high liquidity, and vice versa.
A variant of the Jankowitsch et al. (2011) measure uses the average execution price
on a day as the price benchmark instead of the end-of-day midquote. This should improve
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the performance of the measure on days of high intraday volatility:
(2) DISP VWi,t =
√√√√Ni,t∑
k=1
VLMk,i,t
VLMi,t
(
Pk,i,t − P¯i,t
P¯i,t
)2
,
where notation is as above and P¯i,t is the average execution price on contract i and day t.
We require at least four intraday observations to determine the average execution price.
As estimates of the effective spread, both of the above dispersion metrics are
potentially biased due to intraday volatility. Note that although the second dispersion
metric reduces the intraday volatility bias, it does not eliminate it since the same average
execution price can be obtained from both extremely volatile and relatively stable intraday
paths for the mid-quote. Thus, we also employ the spread estimator proposed in Benos and
Zˇikesˇ (2018) which, subject to weak assumptions about prices, is bias-free.18 The estimator
is equal to:
(3) DISP BZi,t =
√
max{2(3DISP EW2i,t −DISP JNS EW2i,t), 0} ,
where DISP EW and DISP JNS EW are given by the formulas for the previous dispersion
metrics but where VLMk,i,t/VLMi,t is replaced by 1/Ni,t. Note that all dispersion metrics
are comparable across contracts with different base currencies and maturities as they are
percentage deviations from a price benchmark.
18Zˇikesˇ (2017) explores the asymptotic properties of this estimator.
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Our fourth liquidity measure is the Amihud (2002) price impact measure:
(4) AMIHUDi,t =
|Ri,t|
VLMi,t
,
where Ri,t is the price change for contract i on day t and VLMi,t is the total volume
expressed in $ trillions. All of these liquidity measures have been used before in analysis of
OTC derivatives markets and are shown to relate strongly to conventional liquidity proxies.
See for example the evidence in Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009), Friewald,
Jankowitsch and Subrahmanyam (2012), Friewald, Jankowitsch and Subrahmanyam
(2017), Loon and Zhong (2014), Loon and Zhong (2016) and Benos and Zˇikesˇ (2018).
Finally, we also measure liquidity with the relative quoted spread based on intraday
data obtained from Thomson Reuters. Bid and ask quotes for each contract are sampled
every 10 minutes across the trading day and, assuming N intervals in a day, we calculate
the daily average quoted spread for contract i on day t as:
(5) QSPREADi,t =
1
N
N∑
k=1
2(ASKk,i,t − BIDk,i,t)
ASKk,i,t + BIDk,i,t
.
This liquidity measure is included to ensure robustness since it is not dependent on
execution prices, which are used for all other liquidity metrics.
B. Panel Difference-in-Differences Specifications
To assess the impact of SEF trading on market liquidity and activity, we estimate
two panel difference-in-differences models. We wish to see if the introduction of SEF
19
trading for a treatment group of contracts causes their liquidity to diverge from that of a
control group. SEFs were officially authorized by the CFTC (and trades could be executed
on them on a voluntary basis) on Oct. 2, 2013 and the dates on which it became
mandatory for U.S. persons to trade particular contracts on SEFs are shown in Table 1.19
Table 2 summarizes the main variables used in our models.
[TABLE 2]
Before presenting the results of our estimations, it is worth noting that a problem
with our simple difference-in-differences approach is that the set of contracts mandated for
SEF trading is not exogenous. In fact, as detailed in Section II, SEFs themselves determine
which contracts they trade through the MAT procedure. Then, if the set of contracts made
available to trade are precisely those that are most likely to benefit (in liquidity terms)
from SEF trading, any evidence of liquidity improvement that we obtain will be a biased
estimate of the true liquidity benefit associated with SEF trading. However, while it is clear
that contracts made available for trade by SEFs were already the most liquid, this is not
the same as saying that they chose contracts that were most likely to benefit in liquidity
terms from SEF trading. Thus, while it is worth acknowledging there has been selection on
average liquidity in this setting, we suspect that any bias might not be too severe.
Another possible concern with our difference-in-differences framework is that, if SEF
trading causes liquidity to rise for mandated swaps, this improvement might spill over to
19These event dates are well after the implementation of the trade reporting mandate on Dec. 31, 2012
and the clearing mandate on Mar. 11, 2013. The clearing mandate implementation date occurs during our
pre-event sample period, but excluding data prior to this date does not change our results in any important
way.
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non-mandated swaps. For example, if dealers quote tighter spreads for the mandated 10Y
USD swap, this may lead to tighter spreads in the (non-mandated) 9Y USD swap. If
anything, though, this should create a bias towards us finding no significant effects and, in
addition, it is a problem that should not contaminate the comparison of USD and EUR
swaps.
Test 1: USD vs. EUR Mandated Contracts
For our first difference-in-differences test we use the mandated USD-denominated
contracts as a treatment group and mandated EUR-denominated contracts as a control
group. The USD segment of the IRS market has a very high proportion of U.S. participants
who are captured by the CFTC mandate, while the EUR contracts may be mandated but,
as we saw earlier in the lower panel in Figure 2, are mainly traded by non-U.S. persons
who are not required to trade on a SEF. Thus, if transparency improves liquidity, we would
expect the liquidity of USD contracts to improve relative to that of EUR contracts.20 An
advantage of using the mandated EUR contracts as a control group is that the treatment
and control groups have similar liquidity profiles, which implies that our results are not
subject to the selection bias mentioned above. On the other hand, liquidity and activity in
the EUR segment of the market might be driven by different fundamentals. We control for
this by including a number of contract and currency specific control variables in our
20Of course, to the extent that SEFs are also used by those trading in EUR mandated contacts, albeit
to a lower degree, we might expect (small) improvements in their liquidity too.
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specifications. We implement this test by estimating the following panel specification:
Lit = αi + β1DATE
(1)
t + β2CURRi ×DATE(1)t + β3DATE(2)t + β4CURRi ×DATE(2)t(6)
+ γSWAP RVit + δ
′Xt + it ,
where i indexes the set of swap contracts (defined by maturity and currency) such that the
αi are contract-specific fixed effects and t denotes days. Lit is a liquidity or market activity
variable. The liquidity variables are defined in equations (1) to (5) while our activity
variables include daily volume traded, the daily number of trades and the number of
unique market participants active on a day. DATE
(j)
t , j = 1, 2 are dummies for the SEF
authorization and SEF mandate dates, respectively, equalling one after the event and zero
otherwise. CURRi is a dummy equal to one for USD contracts and zero for EUR contracts.
SWAP RV is the daily contract-specific realized variance, calculated using 10 minutely
quotes from Thomson Reuters.21 It is included to make sure that our results are not driven
by any differences in the volatility of the EUR- and USD-denominated contracts. Xt is a
vector of currency-specific control variables intended to capture differences in fundamentals
between the USD and EUR market segments, including stock market returns, stock index
implied volatilities (as proxies for market uncertainty), overnight unsecured borrowing rate
spreads for both markets (as proxies for dealer funding costs) and yield curve slopes. Our
specification explicitly disentangles liquidity/activity in the two currency groups as well as
any changes in liquidity after the two events. The coefficients β1 and β3 capture any effects
that are common to both market segments and coefficients β2 and β4 capture incremental
21The realized variance is smoothed by taking a 30-day rolling average of the daily variances.
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effects that are particular to the USD segment. We cluster the standard errors by both
maturity and currency.
[FIGURE 3]
The left-column of plots in Figure 3 displays time-series of cross-swap mean values of
our key dependent variables, separately for the EUR MAT and USD MAT samples, in the
window prior to the SEF mandate date. These are displayed to shed light on the ‘parallel
trends’ assumption that underlies our difference-in-differences analysis. The assumption
appears to be a reasonable one for these data as the liquidity variables all evolve in rather
similar fashion in the period of time before the SEF trading mandate came into force.
[TABLE 3]
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of these estimations for the liquidity and activity
variables respectively. The models are estimated with and without the control variables.
Table 3 shows that after SEF trading became available on Oct. 2, 2013 there is an
improvement in liquidity for both market segments as the significantly negative coefficients
on DATE(1) and the insignificant interaction terms indicate. The only exception to this is
for the quoted spreads, where a small but significant reduction in liquidity for USD
contracts can be seen. Following the enforcement of the SEF trading mandate there is a
clear differential effect between the USD and EUR segments of the market with the USD
contracts showing a significant further liquidity improvement relative to the EUR
contracts. This improvement is visible across all liquidity measures, with 11 of the 12
interaction terms being significantly negative at a 5% level and the other coefficient
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significantly negative at 10%. Also, for USD quoted spreads, the second event date
interaction is negative and much larger in magnitude than the positive interaction on the
first event date, implying that overall USD quoted spreads fall relative to EUR spreads.
[TABLE 4]
The results in Table 4 suggest that there was a reduction in activity for EUR
contracts and a respective increase in USD contracts mainly after the first event date (i.e.,
when SEF trading became available). It is interesting to note that, while activity in EUR
mandated contracts declined, liquidity actually improved, as the market became more
transparent. We do not observe any significant difference in trading activity between the
USD and EUR contracts after the second event (Feb. 2014). Another noteworthy effect is
that after both events, the number of parties trading in USD markets rose significantly
relative to the number of traders in EUR markets. Thus, participation in USD markets
grew.
In the activity and liquidity regressions, there are few consistently signed and
consistently significant control variables. The realized volatility variable is always positive
in the liquidity regressions (and is significant in half of the specifications). The VIX and
VDAX are also often positive and significant (except in the quoted spread regressions) in
the liquidity regressions. In the activity regressions, the control variables are only
occasionally significant.
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Test 2: USD Mandated vs. USD Non-mandated Contracts
For the second difference-in-differences test we concentrate exclusively on USD
contracts and use the mandated maturities as a treatment group and non-mandated USD
swaps as the control group.22 This test has the advantage of looking at contracts whose
prices are driven by the same fundamentals and also cleanly compares mandated versus
non-mandated contracts. We estimate the following panel regression:
Lit = αi + β1DATE
(1)
t + β2MATi ×DATE(1)t + β3DATE(2)t + β4MATi ×DATE(2)t(7)
+ γSWAP RVit + δ
′Xt + it ,
where now i denotes maturities and t denotes days. The αi terms are again
contract-specific fixed effects. The key right-hand side variables used are the same as before
with the only difference being that we now have a dummy variable (MATi) indicating
whether a given contract maturity has been mandated by the CFTC.
The right-column of plots in Figure 3 gives our ‘parallel trends’ analysis for the
USD MAT versus non-MAT samples. Again, there is evidence that the dispersion measures
are neither diverging nor converging across the two samples. For the quoted spread data,
there is a small level shift in MAT spreads roughly 4 months before the first event date,
which is gradually eroded as we approach the mandate event date. For the Amihud
measure, the trend in USD non-MAT contracts is rather noisy although there is no sign of
22The mandated maturities are: 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 6Y, 7Y, 10Y, 12Y, 15Y, 20Y and 30Y. The
non-mandated maturities are: 1Y, 8Y, 9Y and 25Y.
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divergence (or convergence) with that of USD MAT contracts. For this reason, we are
inclined to place less weight on the difference-in-differences results from this variable.
[TABLE 5]
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of these estimations for the liquidity and activity
variables and for specifications with and without controls. There is evidence of liquidity
improvement for both mandated and non-mandated contracts after SEF trading became
available on Oct. 2, 2013. This is particularly clear in the dispersion metrics, but not for
the Amihud measures or the quoted spread data. Focussing on the dispersion-based
liquidity measures, after the second event date the liquidity of the mandated contracts
tends to increase again while, if anything, that of non-mandated contracts deteriorates
slightly. The picture is less clear for quoted spreads and the Amihud measure. On the
second event date, the coefficients on the interaction terms for these dependent variables
are always negative, but they are not quite significant at conventional levels (with
t-statistics between −1.30 and −1.50).
Thus, the broad picture here is of greater liquidity for mandated and non-mandated
USD contracts with the increase being significantly greater for the former. It is fair to say,
though, that evidence of a liquidity improvement for mandated contracts from these
estimations is less strong than that obtained from comparison of USD and EUR mandated
contracts. One interpretation of this finding is that the liquidity improvements in the
mandated USD contracts spilled over to non-mandated USD contracts. This may be
because market participants might also have chosen to trade non-mandated contracts on
SEFs as soon as the functionality became available, and possibly also because, as discussed
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above, more transparency for some quoted prices on the USD maturity curve gives market
participants a better idea of what a fair quote is for other USD maturities.
[TABLE 6]
As far as activity and participation are concerned, Table 6 shows that, as for the
estimations using the EUR control sample, there are positive effects occurring in the period
after Oct. 2, 2013, but only for the mandated contracts.
Economic Significance of Liquidity Improvement
We next assess the economic significance of the observed liquidity improvements by
calculating an implied dollar reduction in execution costs for market end-users. The market
value of an IRS is set to zero at initiation by selecting the fixed rate such that the present
values of the fixed and floating legs are the same. However, a bid–ask spread charged by a
dealer on top of the fixed rate, would affect the value of the swap and thus introduce an
additional cost incurred by the end-user. The total dollar value of this cost can in principle
be approximated by:
COST($) ≈ SPREAD× P ×m× TRADE SIZE ,
where SPREAD is the relative effective spread of a transaction in an IRS contract with a
maturity of m years, P is the prevailing swap rate and TRADE SIZE is the amount of
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notional traded. This formula is just the change in the market value of a swap when the
swap rate is increased by the (percentage) effective spread.23
We extend this approach in order to calculate the reduction in execution costs
resulting from the trade mandate. In our case, the relative effective spread is approximated
by any of the dispersion measures defined in equations (1)-(3). We base these calculations
on Test 1 (i.e., the comparison of USD with EUR mandated contracts), because mandated
contracts are the most heavily traded segment of the market. Since our
difference-in-differences specifications in equation (6) are estimated on a daily basis, we
approximate the daily dollar incremental reduction in execution costs for USD mandated
contracts relative to EUR mandated contracts by:
(8) ∆COST(USD MAT vs EUR MAT) ≈ (βˆ2+ βˆ4)× P¯ ×MATURITY×VLM×D2C(%) ,
where βˆ2, βˆ4 are the estimated coefficients of the date-currency interaction terms in
equation (6), P¯ is the average volume-weighted price of the USD mandated contracts
(1.7%), MATURITY is their average volume-weighted maturity (7 years) and VLM is their
average daily volume ($75 billion). Finally, we multiply with the average fraction of
dealer-to-client volume (33%) to estimate the reduction in execution costs that accrues to
market end-users. Similarly, the total reduction in execution costs for to USD mandated
23The swap rate, P , is multiplied by the percentage spread and then by notional so as to yield a dollar
figure. The cost is incurred every year until maturity with each payment of the fixed rate and therefore
multiplied by m. Note that we sum Dollar costs across years without discounting which, given the
historically low interest rates over our sample period, should not change the result very much.
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contracts is given by:
(9) ∆COST(USD MAT) ≈ ( 4∑
i=1
βˆi
)× P¯ ×MATURITY× VLM×D2C(%) ,
where here we include the sum of all estimated dummy coefficients βˆi from equation (6).
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This calculation suggests that the effects of the trade mandate are economically
significant. The coefficients for the CURR×DATE(1) and CURR×DATE(2) terms in the
dispersion specifications give an incremental reduction in execution costs for USD
mandated versus EUR mandated contracts of between 12% and 19% of previous
cross-currency average dispersion levels. This amounts to a daily reduction of
approximately $3–$6 million for end-users. The total reduction in execution costs for USD
mandated contracts is larger, at 22% to 32% of previous dispersion levels, which amounts
to roughly $7–$11 million daily for end-users. The effect on the EUR contracts is also
substantial, despite the fact that fewer participants are captured by the mandate. The
reduction in execution costs there is 10% to 14% or $3–$5 million daily.
C. Liquidity in D2D versus D2C Trades
In this section we investigate whether the liquidity improvements for SEF-traded
contracts are visible both in trades between dealers and clients (D2C) trades and
interdealer (D2D) trades. Does SEF trading allow dealers to rebalance inventories more
cheaply or are end-users able to enter positions more cheaply or both?
24Note, though, that only the incremental reduction in execution costs can be causally attributed to the
trade mandate.
29
[TABLES 7 and 8]
In Tables 7 and 8, we re-run our liquidity panel regressions, but where the dependent
variable is now constructed from either D2D trades or D2C trades. Unfortunately, we
cannot separate either the quoted spread data or the Amihud measure into D2D and D2C
components (as they are not based on individual trades) and so we have results only for
the dispersion measures. We only report results for the specifications with all the controls.
The first 3 regressions in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that, after the SEF mandate date,
D2C trades in the treated group of swaps always experience a liquidity improvement (i.e.,
dispersion falls), regardless of which control group we use and regardless of the dispersion
measure used to approximate liquidity. This increase in liquidity is significant in 5 of the 6
regressions. There is no consistent movement in D2C liquidity for treated group relative to
control group swaps on the first event date. Only one of the first event date interactions is
significant and that too suggests an improvement in liquidity when SEF trading is available.
For D2D trading, the picture is much less clear. The results, in the last 3 regressions
in Tables 7 and 8, show that liquidity of D2D trades in USD mandated contracts improves
relative to that of D2D trades in mandated EUR swaps after the SEF mandate date for all
of the dispersion measures. However, there is no such improvement in D2D liquidity for
mandated USD contracts relative to non-mandated USD contracts. The results suggest that
D2D liquidity improves for both mandated and non-mandated USD contracts, in particular
after the first event date (with results for one liquidity proxy showing that liquidity
improves more for non-mandated contracts than for mandated contracts on this date).
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Thus, overall, our regressions show that end-users of swaps have experienced
consistent liquidity benefits from mandated SEF trading. The picture for interdealer trades
is less clear, in that we do not see uniform evidence that their trading has become less
expensive.
D. SEF Flag Panel Specifications
We next test how the fraction of SEF trading affects liquidity and market activity.
For this, we utilize the DTCC segment of our data which contains a flag indicating whether
a given trade was executed on a SEF. We estimate the following panel specification for
mandated USD and EUR-denominated contracts only, on a daily frequency:
(10) Lit = αi + β1SEFit + β2DATE
(1)
t + γSWAP RVit + δ
′Xt + it ,
where Lit is one of the previously defined liquidity or market activity variables for contract
i on day t, SEFit is the percentage of SEF trading, DATE
(1)
t is defined as above, and Xt is
the usual vector of controls. We include the date dummy in the specification to control for
any effects on the dependent variable related to SEF trading being available regardless of
the degree of actual SEF trading. For instance, dealers could be quoting narrower spreads
simply because they know that SEF trading is possible and their quotes are potentially
subject to comparison and scrutiny by end-users. This effect could materialize regardless of
the actual amount of SEF trading.25 Because it is possible that SEF trading is itself caused
25We also estimate model (10) only using data after the introduction of SEF trading. The results for the
liquidity variables are similar to those reported below and for this reason they are omitted.
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by market liquidity, we also estimate this model using instrumental variables,
instrumenting SEFit with its own lags.
[TABLES 9 and 10]
Tables 9 and 10 show the results of these estimations. The coefficients on the
percentage of SEF trading are significant in 14 of the 16 regressions and consistent with
previous findings. A higher fraction of SEF trading is associated with increased levels of
liquidity (i.e., lower dispersion, spreads and Amihud measures). Similarly, SEF trading is
positive and statistically significant in the regressions for activity variables: a higher
fraction of SEF trading is associated with higher volumes, more trades and a larger number
of market participants. Overall, these results suggest that SEF trading is associated with
robust and measurable improvements in market quality.
V. SEFs and Dealer Market Power
A. Relationships Between Dealers and Clients
Duffie et al. (2005) and Yin (2005) argue that the beneficial effects of pre-trade
transparency on liquidity come via the effect of transparency on dealer competition. More
intense dealer competition leads to better prices for customers. We have already seen, in
Tables 4 and 6, that the introduction of SEF trading increased the number of parties
trading swaps, potentially making these markets more competitive. In this section we
explore whether the trading relationships between individual customers and dealers have
changed as a result of the CFTC trade mandate. If SEF trading has led to more intense
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competition between dealers, we would expect the number of dealers that the average
customer trades with to have risen for swaps subject to the SEF trading mandate.
We create a variable, NDEALERSit, that counts the number of unique dealers with
whom customer i trades in month t, based on trades across all EUR and USD mandated
swaps. As a first pass, we aggregate NDEALERSit across months and end-users for the
period before mandatory SEF trading and then do the same for the period after the
mandate came into force. Figure 4 displays the frequency distributions of those two
samples. It is clear that SEF trading is associated with a dramatic rightwards shift in the
distribution. For example, prior to the cutoff date, around 28% of customers traded only
with a single dealer. After the SEF trading mandate, this number dropped to 8%.
Similarly, prior to Feb. 2014, over 50% of customers dealt with 3 or fewer dealers, while
after this date the corresponding number was around 20%.
[FIGURE 4]
These numbers immediately suggest that there have been profound changes in the
nature of the interactions between swap dealers and customers. The improvements in
pre-trade transparency have weakened the ties between individual customers and particular
dealers: customer search costs have fallen and thus it has become easier for customers to
trade with the dealer showing the best price. Thus, effective competition between dealers
has risen and, as shown above, this has led to lower execution costs.
As the CFTC trade mandate only captures U.S. persons, one would also expect any
changes in the dealer-client relationships to be more pronounced for U.S. persons. To test
this, we estimate a difference-in-differences model using the cross-section of all clients in our
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sample. Using our NDEALERSit variable for every customer and every month, we estimate
NDEALERSit = ai + bU Si(11)
+ c1 DATE
(1)
t + c2 (DATE
(1)
t × U Si) + c3 (DATE(1)t × ACTIVEi)
+ d1 DATE
(2)
t + d2 (DATE
(2)
t × U Si) + d3 (DATE(2)t × ACTIVEi)
+ f1 ACTIVEi + f2 (U Si × ACTIVEi) + f3 (DATE(1)t × U Si × ACTIVEi)
+ f4 (DATE
(2)
t × U Si × ACTIVEi) + γ′ Xit + uit ,
where t denotes months, i indexes end-users and ai is a fixed effect for end-user i. The date
dummies are defined as above. The Xi,t vector contains end-user specific trading activity
variables (including number of trades and total volume executed). U S is a dummy for
clients that are U.S.-persons, while ACTIVEit is a dummy that identifies a client who
trades at least 20 times per month on average (i.e., roughly once a day or more). In our
data, there are a large number of end-users who trade very infrequently (e.g., once a week
or less) and for whom NDEALERSit is thus always low regardless of the trading
environment. So, in order to focus on clients for whom increased dealer competition and
greater liquidity is going to be most valuable, we separate the active from the less active
clients in the dummy specification in the regression
Table 11 shows the results of this estimation. The implementation of the SEF
trading mandate leads to the active set of U.S. clients executing against a significantly
larger number of dealers. Prior to the mandate date, and focussing on the results without
control variables for clarity of interpretation, the significant coefficients indicate that those
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active U.S. clients dealt with around 9 dealers per month on average and afterwards this
increases by around 17%, or 1.6 dealers, on average. This change is statistically significant,
while there are no significant shifts for non-U.S. or inactive clients. The specification with
control variables yields qualitatively similar findings, although in that case the less active
U.S. clients see a small, marginally significant drop in the number of dealers they trade
with after the mandate date.
[TABLE 11]
Thus, our graphical and econometric evidence is consistent. After the introduction of
mandatory SEF trading competition between dealers intensified, particularly for the set of
active U.S. clients, and this likely contributes to the fall we observe in clients’ trading costs.
B. The Geography of Trading and Dealer Market Power
Shortly after the SEF trading mandate took effect, one concern among market
participants and regulators was that it might lead the global swaps market to fragment
along geographical lines (ISDA (2014)). Since the mandate only applied to U.S. persons it
was conceivable that, for example, European counterparties who wished to avoid trading
on a SEF might do so by trading exclusively with other European counterparties. Indeed,
some reports released after the implementation of the mandate suggested that the market
was fragmenting and that this was causing market quality to deteriorate (e.g., Giancarlo
(2015)).
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To shed light on this issue, we exploit the data on counterparty identities for the
LCH trades. We classify market participants as either U.S. or non-U.S.-based and calculate
the percentage of trading volume executed between those two groups (U.S.-to-non-U.S.).
[FIGURE 5]
Figure 5 plots this percentage for USD and EUR-denominated contracts. It is
evident that after the introduction of SEF trading there is a clear reduction in the fraction
of U.S.-to-non-U.S. volume in EUR-denominated swaps, from around 20% to 5%. There is
no similar effect in USD contracts. More formally, the first two columns of Table 12 show
the results of time-series regressions of the fractions of U.S.-to-non-U.S. volumes in USD
and EUR contracts on the SEF introduction event dummy and a number of controls. The
dummy coefficient is highly significant and negative for the EUR contracts and
insignificant for USD contracts. Thus the EUR segment of the swap market became
significantly more geographically fragmented following the introduction of SEF trading.
[TABLE 12]
As previously discussed, it is likely that the observed difference between the two
market segments is because of the much smaller proportion of U.S. market players in
EUR-denominated swaps trading. If a non-U.S. counterparty wants to trade with a
non-U.S. counterparty and avoid SEF execution, this is much simpler for a
EUR-denominated contract than for a USD-denominated one. Given the preponderance of
U.S. persons trading USD swaps, it is hard to avoid trading with a U.S. person and thus on
a SEF.
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However, given the beneficial effects of SEF trading, the obvious question is why
any (and which) counterparties might want to avoid trading on SEFs. Figure 6 shows a
breakdown of the fraction of U.S.-to-non-U.S. volume in the EUR-denominated contracts
according to the type of counterparties. It is clear that the observed fragmentation is
entirely driven by interdealer trading and the last two columns of Table 12 confirm this.
Thus, it appears that it is swap dealers who are trying to avoid using SEFs where possible.
There is no observable fragmentation for EUR trades that involve at least one non-dealer.
This might have been expected, as there is no incentive for customers to avoid trading on
SEFs given the liquidity improvements they offer.
[FIGURE 6]
The question that remains is why cross-border activity by EUR swap dealers
dropped so clearly when the SEF trading mandate was introduced in the United States.
One possibility is that interdealer trading between U.S.-based and non-U.S.-based dealers
could genuinely have exogenously declined and could have been replaced by local
(intra-U.S. and intra-European) trading. Alternatively, interdealer trades between U.S. and
non-U.S. firms could have been executed by the non-U.S. branches of swap dealers who
happen to have trading desks in multiple jurisdictions. For example, a trade in EUR
between a U.S. and a European dealer that was being executed by the U.S. desk of the
former, could now be executed by the European desk of the same dealer. In this case, it
would be registered as an intra-European trade and would not be subject to the SEF trade
mandate.
[FIGURES 7 and 8]
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To see if this is the case, we plot in Figure 7 the fraction of interdealer trading in
EUR contracts done by the U.S. and non-U.S. trading desks of only those swap dealers
who have desks in multiple jurisdictions and who execute more than 10% of their swap
volumes from a desk located in the United States. The figure shows that there is a sharp
shift in interdealer activity from the U.S. desks to the non-U.S. ones. The fraction of
non-U.S. desk trading increases from a daily average of 75% prior to the introduction of
SEFs, to an average of 95% after (with the corresponding fraction of U.S. desk trading
dropping from 25% to 5%). Additionally, Figure 8 shows that there is virtually no change
in the amount of interdealer trading done exclusively by dealers who regularly trade the
bulk (i.e., more than 90%) of their derivatives from their European desks. We interpret this
as implying that the observed geographical fragmentation is artificial in the sense that it is
entirely driven by EUR swap dealers in large institutions using their non-U.S. desks to do
business that would previously have passed through their U.S. desk.
These results are consistent with (although not direct proof of) swap dealers
strategically choosing the location of the desk executing a particular trade in order to avoid
trading in a more transparent and competitive setting. A potential explanation for this lies
in attempts to maintain market power. By shifting the location of the interdealer market in
EUR swaps to Europe and using European entities to execute, the SEF trading mandate
and the associated CFTC impartial access requirements are avoided.26 This allows dealers
to retain power, in that they retain control over who they trade with and how, which in
turn would allow them to exclude any potential new competitors from interdealer trading.
26The CFTC guidance is available at: https:
//www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/dmostaffguidance111413.pdf
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If a potential competitor cannot access interdealer markets to manage inventory, their
quotes are likely to be less tight and thus they are less likely to attract business in the
customer market.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
One of the pillars of the G20 reform agenda for OTC derivatives markets is the
requirement to migrate trading activity to more centralized, more transparent venues. In
response, as part of Dodd–Frank, U.S. regulators have mandated that U.S. persons should
trade certain IRS contracts on SEFs. These venues improve transparency by automatically
disseminating requests for quotes to multiple dealers and by featuring an electronic order
book which allows any market participant to compete with dealers for liquidity provision
by posting quotes. Thus, SEFs induce competition between existing dealers and also lower
the barriers to potential entrants to the dealing community.
Using transaction data from the IRS market we assess the impact of SEF
introduction on swap market activity and liquidity. Our findings suggest that the move
from an OTC to a more centralized, competitive market structure leads to a reduction in
execution costs. This is more pronounced for mandated USD contracts as these are
primarily traded by U.S. persons who are captured by the trade mandate. For these
contracts, dispersion-based liquidity measures show that liquidity improves by 12% to 19%
relative to EUR mandated contracts. This amounts to daily savings in execution costs of as
much as $3–$6 million for end-users of USD swaps.
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We then demonstrate that the introduction of centralized trading resulted in a
sharp increase in competition between swap dealers. The average active U.S. client in this
market trades with a significantly greater number of dealers after the centralized trading
mandate. Thus, dealer competition rises and liquidity improves, as one would expect.
Additionally, we find that, for the EUR-denominated swap market, the bulk of
interdealer trading previously executed between U.S. and non-U.S. trading desks is now
largely executed by the non-U.S. (mostly European) trading desks of the same institutions
(i.e., banks have shifted interdealer trading of their EUR swap positions from their U.S.
desks to their European desks). We interpret this as an indication that swap dealers wish
to avoid being captured by the SEF trading mandate and the associated impartial access
requirements. Migrating the EUR interdealer volume off-SEFs enables dealers to choose
who to trade with and (more importantly) who not to trade with. This might allow them
to erect barriers to potential entrants to the dealing community. Thus this fragmentation of
the global market may be interpreted as dealers trying to retain market power, where
possible. Importantly, we find no evidence that customers in EUR swap markets try to
avoid SEF trading and the improved liquidity it delivers.
Overall, given the global nature of OTC derivatives markets, our findings suggest
that extending the scope of the trading mandate to cover other sufficiently liquid swap
markets could be beneficial. Such regulation was implemented at the start of 2018 in the
EU as part of MiFIR.
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FIGURE 1
Total Traded Volume (in $ billion) by Currency.
Figure 1 shows the total volume of EUR-denominated and USD-denominated plain vanilla swaps.
The sample covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap which was either cleared by LCH or
reported to DTCC between Jan. 1, 2013 and Sept. 15, 2014.
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FIGURE 2
Volume Shares by Type of Counterparty or Location.
Figure 2 decomposes the total volume into i) dealer-to-dealer (D2D), dealer-to-client (D2C), and
client-to-client (C2C) trading; and ii) U.S.-to-U.S., U.S.-to-non-U.S., and non-U.S.-to-non-U.S.
trading. The inner circle presents the volumes of USD-denominated swaps, while the outer circle
presents the volumes of EUR-denominated swaps. The sample covers every spot vanilla interest
rate swap which was cleared by LCH between Jan. 1, 2013 and Sept. 15, 2014.
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FIGURE 3
Parallel Trends.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of our key liquidity measures, for treated and control samples, prior
to the second event date. The liquidity measures shown are smoothed price dispersions, quoted
spreads and the Amihud measure and they have been averaged across the members of the
relevant set of contracts on each date.
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FIGURE 4
Number of Dealers per Client.
Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of the number of dealers with whom end-users trade
before and after Feb. 2014, when SEF trading becomes mandatory for all U.S. persons trading
any mandated IRS contracts. The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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FIGURE 5
Fraction of U.S.-to-non-U.S. Trading.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of U.S.-to-non-U.S. trading in USD- and EUR-denominated swaps.
The sample covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap transaction reported to LCH. The vertical
line marks the introduction of SEFs (Oct. 2, 2013). The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15,
2014.
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FIGURE 6
Breakdown of U.S.-to-non-U.S. Trading.
Figure 6 shows the breakdown of U.S.-to-non-U.S. trading volume in EUR-denominated swaps
into interdealer volume and all other trading volume. The sample covers every spot vanilla
interest rate swap transaction reported to LCH. The vertical line marks the introduction of SEFs
(Oct. 2, 2013). The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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FIGURE 7
Breakdown of Interdealer Volume by Trading Desk Location.
Figure 7 plots the fractions of interdealer trading in EUR-denominated swaps executed by U.S.
and non-U.S. trading desks, for all swap dealers that have trading desks in the United States and
at least one more jurisdiction. The sample covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap transaction
reported to LCH. The vertical line marks the introduction of SEFs (Oct. 2, 2013). The time
period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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FIGURE 8
Interdealer Trading by Swap Dealers with No U.S. Trading Desks.
Figure 8 plots the amount of interdealer trading in EUR-denominated swaps executed exclusively
by swap dealers that have no trading desks in the United States. The sample covers every spot
vanilla interest rate swap transaction reported to LCH. The vertical line marks the introduction
of SEFs (Oct. 2, 2013). The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
01/2013 03/2013 05/2013 07/2013 09/2013 10/2013 12/2013 02/2014 04/2014 06/2014 08/2014
V
o
lu
m
e 
($
 b
ill
io
n
) 
Introduction of SEF trading 
54
TABLE 1
SEF Trading Mandate Dates.
Table 1 shows the SEF trading mandate dates by currency and maturity for plain vanilla IRS
contracts used in our study.
Currency Maturity Effective Date
USD 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30 15/02/2014
EUR 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30 15/02/2014
USD 4, 6 26/02/2014
EUR 4, 6 26/02/2014
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics by Currency.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of daily values of the key variables, by currency. It shows
statistics on trading volume (VLM) measured in $ billions; daily number of trades (NTRADES);
daily unique number of active counterparties (NPARTIES); the fraction of SEF (SEF),
dealer-to-dealer (D2D), and U.S. to non-U.S. (U.S.-to-non-U.S.) trading. It also shows statistics
on the three dispersion measures, the Amihud price impact measure and the quoted spread as
defined in equations (1)- (5). The data consists of all LCH and DTCC reported transactions for
USD- and EUR-denominated plain vanilla swaps. The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15,
2014.
USD EUR
Variables Mean StDev Min Max N Mean StDev Min Max N
Panel A: Liquidity variables
DISP VW(%) 0.72 0.47 0 4.16 5,875 0.66 0.46 0 3.67 5,463
DISP JNS(%) 0.91 0.58 0.05 4.29 5,875 1.16 0.82 0.07 4.60 5,463
DISP BZ(%) 1.15 0.90 0 5.67 5,875 0.68 0.87 0 6.10 5,463
AMIHUD 14.52 42.03 0.00 1031.75 5,870 9.50 17.49 0.00 447.32 5,817
QSPREAD(%) 2.11 1.89 0.39 9.95 5,742 3.68 3.48 0.55 42.68 5,817
Panel B: Activity variables
VLM ($ billion) 5.66 7.36 0.02 64.58 5875 4.44 4.49 0.06 44.90 5,463
NTRADES 72.88 95.18 4 676 5875 39.82 45.36 4 346 5,463
NPARTIES 22.04 12.25 2 61 5740 19.68 8.59 2 49 5,791
Panel C: Market structure
SEF (%) 0.48 0.44 0 1 5820 0.20 0.32 0 1 5,072
D2D (%) 0.54 0.24 0 1 5740 0.61 0.21 0 1 5,791
U.S.-to-non-U.S. (%) 0.48 0.21 0 1 5740 0.14 0.16 0 0.96 5,791
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TABLE 4
Panel Difference-in-Differences Specification for Activity Variables.
Table 4 shows estimation results of equation (6), where the treatment group are the USD
mandated contracts and the control group are the EUR mandated contracts. VLM is the amount
of gross notional traded in U.S. dollars, NTRADES is the number of trades executed and
NPARTIES is the number of unique counterparties active on a given day. DATE(1) is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 after the introduction of SEF trading on Oct. 2, 2013 and
DATE(2) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the mandate effective dates as per
Table 1. CURR is a dummy that takes the value 1 for USD-denominated contracts, and 0
otherwise. SWAP RV is the daily maturity/currency-specific variance of each swap contract
calculated using a 30-day rolling window. VIX and VDAX are the S&P 500 and DAX volatility
indices and logRSP500 and logRDAX are the daily log returns on the indices themselves.
O/N SPREAD USD and O/N SPREAD EUR are the differences between the overnight
unsecured borrowing rates and the respective central bank rates. SLOPE USD and SLOPE EUR
are the spreads between the 10-year and 3-month government securities of the United States and
the investment grade Eurozone countries respectively. The model is estimated using maturity and
currency fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by maturity and currency. Robust t-statistics
are shown in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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TABLE 4 (continued)
USD mandated vs. EUR mandated - Activity variables
VLM VLM NTRADES NTRADES NPARTIES NPARTIES
DATE(1) -0.3433** -0.4270** -4.2991*** -6.3279*** 0.0583 -0.4482
(-2.61) (-2.56) (-2.91) (-3.46) (0.27) (-1.06)
CURR × DATE(1) 2.4496*** 2.1238*** 22.4662*** 18.7042*** 1.4968** 0.8772
(3.15) (2.85) (3.29) (2.95) (2.26) (1.39)
DATE(2) -0.7535** -0.6740 -6.4935** -10.7412** -1.1243*** -1.4809***
(-2.74) (-1.69) (-2.37) (-2.32) (-3.06) (-3.70)
CURR × DATE(2) 0.3077 0.3333 4.0289 4.0268 1.1234** 1.0083*
(0.77) (0.77) (1.16) (1.08) (2.11) (1.91)
SWAP RV 20.8778 -141.3714 -121.3896
(0.20) (-0.16) (-0.63)
VIX -0.0227 0.2091 0.0460
(-0.79) (0.68) (0.90)
VDAX 0.1549*** 1.6553*** 0.2651***
(3.23) (3.12) (4.54)
logRSP500 -6.0106 -48.2967 4.5398
(-1.13) (-0.90) (0.54)
logRDAX -4.2459 -119.4527** -11.2663
(-1.12) (-2.10) (-1.66)
SLOPE USD -0.3819 -3.2920 0.6334
(-0.96) (-0.89) (0.97)
SLOPE EUR 1.2889** 3.0552 0.2681
(2.83) (0.59) (0.31)
O/N SPREAD USD -0.8503 -1.8934 -0.5551
(-0.78) (-0.17) (-0.19)
O/N SPREAD EUR 2.1692*** 28.1735*** 3.1105***
(3.83) (3.54) (3.36)
CONSTANT 5.6516*** 2.9138** 64.8541*** 51.1500*** 23.0793*** 18.1139***
(25.80) (2.24) (30.44) (3.92) (100.95) (11.02)
Within-R2 0.042 0.049 0.033 0.043 0.013 0.028
N 8,821 8,205 8,821 8,205 8,821 8,205
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TABLE 6
Panel Difference-in-Differences Specification for Activity Variables.
Table 6 estimation results of specification (7), where the treatment group consists of the USD
mandated contracts and the control group of the USD non-mandated contracts. VLM is the
amount of gross notional traded in U.S. dollars, NTRADES is the number of trades executed and
NPARTIES is the number of unique counterparties active on a given day. DATE(1) is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 after the introduction of SEF trading on Oct. 2, 2013 and
DATE(2) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the mandate effective dates as per
Table 1. MAT is a dummy that takes the value 1 for mandated contracts, and 0 otherwise.
SWAP RV is the daily maturity/currency-specific realized variance of each swap contract
calculated using a 30-day rolling window. VIX and VDAX are the S&P 500 and DAX volatility
indices and logRSP500 and logRDAX are the daily log returns on the indices themselves.
O/N SPREAD USD and O/N SPREAD EUR are the differences between the overnight
unsecured borrowing rates and the respective central bank rates. SLOPE USD and SLOPE EUR
are the spreads between the 10-year and 3-month government securities of the United States and
the investment grade Eurozone countries respectively. Standard errors are clustered by maturity.
Robust t-statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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TABLE 6 (continued)
USD mandated vs. USD non-mandated - Activity variables
VLM VLM NTRADES NTRADES NPARTIES NPARTIES
DATE(1) 0.1963 -0.2287 0.5327 -6.1345*** -0.5161*** -1.9857***
(1.64) (-1.12) (1.24) (-3.05) (-3.91) (-6.32)
MAT × DATE(1) 1.9100** 1.7259** 17.6343** 15.1957** 2.0712*** 1.6324**
(2.43) (2.29) (2.61) (2.33) (3.20) (2.73)
DATE(2) -0.0645 0.2186 0.2127 -3.4326 -0.1081 -0.3922
(-0.30) (0.56) (0.41) (-0.75) (-0.45) (-0.83)
MAT × DATE(2) -0.3813 -0.5056 -2.6773 -3.8244 0.1072 -0.1751
(-1.05) (-1.41) (-1.20) (-1.69) (0.23) (-0.41)
SWAP RV -225.4282 -1824.3714 -548.4686***
(-1.55) (-1.46) (-3.73)
VIX -0.0023 0.3802 0.1052
(-0.06) (0.88) (1.76)
VDAX 0.1501** 1.5821* 0.1283*
(2.29) (2.11) (1.79)
logRSP500 -17.6012** -123.1580 -7.8017
(-2.79) (-1.65) (-0.92)
logRDAX -5.7087 -165.8872* -24.8985***
(-1.23) (-2.14) (-3.55)
SLOPE USD 2.0095 20.1599 5.0426
(1.57) (1.56) (1.55)
SLOPE EUR 2.0631** 32.4400*** 3.2482***
(2.97) (2.99) (3.52)
O/N SPREAD USD -0.0608 -0.2133 1.4658**
(-0.17) (-0.05) (2.37)
O/N SPREAD EUR 1.4410** 3.0573 -0.1475
(2.54) (0.46) (-0.21)
CONSTANT 4.6513*** 1.2543 62.1412*** 47.1781** 20.9446*** 17.4549***
(14.97) (0.69) (20.93) (2.57) (62.82) (7.66)
Within-R2 0.049 0.061 0.031 0.045 0.013 0.033
N 5,875 5,453 5,875 5,453 5,875 5,453
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TABLE 7
Panel Difference-in-Differences Specification for Liquidity Variables Using D2C or D2D Trades.
Table 7 shows estimation results of equation (6), where the treatment group are the USD
mandated contracts and the control group are the EUR mandated contracts. The liquidity
metrics are defined in equations (1)–(5) but the measures are constructed from either
dealer-to-client (first three columns) or dealer-to-dealer (last three columns) trade prices.
DATE(1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the introduction of SEF trading on
Oct. 2, 2013 and DATE(2) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the mandate
effective dates as per Table 1. CURR is a dummy that takes the value 1 for USD-denominated
contracts, and 0 otherwise. SWAP RV is the daily maturity/currency-specific variance of each
swap contract calculated using a 30-day rolling window. VIX and VDAX are the S&P 500 and
DAX volatility indices and logRSP500 and logRDAX are the daily log returns on the indices
themselves. O/N SPREAD USD and O/N SPREAD EUR are the differences between the
overnight unsecured borrowing rates and the respective central bank rates. SLOPE USD and
SLOPE EUR are the spreads between the 10-year and 3-month government securities of the
United States and the investment grade Eurozone countries respectively. The model is estimated
using maturity and currency fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by maturity and currency.
Robust t-statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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TABLE 7 (continued)
USD mandated vs. EUR mandated - Liquidity variables
D2C D2D
DISP VW DISP JNS DISP BZ DISP VW DISP JNS DISP BZ
DATE(1) -0.1605*** -0.3344*** -0.1253*** -0.2077*** -0.3253*** -0.2277***
(-5.68) (-6.00) (-2.94) (-6.46) (-6.52) (-4.75)
CURR × DATE(1) -0.0370 0.0392 -0.1066* 0.0002 0.0240 -0.0148
(-1.18) (0.69) (-2.00) (0.01) (0.59) (-0.27)
DATE(2) 0.0329 0.0545 0.0777* 0.0021 0.0263 0.0521
(0.94) (0.89) (1.76) (0.08) (0.50) (1.29)
CURR × DATE(2) -0.0679* -0.1264* -0.1005* -0.0923** -0.1441** -0.1707***
(-1.80) (-1.96) (-1.95) (-2.47) (-2.29) (-3.80)
SWAP RV 29.2816** 52.9601* 46.5183*** 34.0819* 64.3465* 36.6113
(2.37) (2.07) (4.30) (1.75) (1.89) (1.67)
VIX 0.0121** 0.0111** 0.0211** 0.0083* 0.0043 0.0180*
(2.75) (2.20) (2.13) (1.81) (0.91) (2.07)
VDAX 0.0081 0.0216*** 0.0086 0.0124** 0.0260*** 0.0113
(1.67) (3.45) (1.00) (2.57) (4.04) (1.28)
logRSP500 -0.8544 -1.6085 -2.3369 -2.9483*** -4.1101*** -4.0304*
(-0.68) (-1.53) (-0.95) (-2.93) (-3.96) (-1.81)
logRDAX -0.2588 -4.0102** 2.1912* 1.4921** -1.5449 6.3466***
(-0.34) (-2.73) (2.03) (2.18) (-1.33) (5.34)
SLOPE USD -0.0967** -0.1177** -0.1878*** -0.1337*** -0.1579** -0.2190***
(-2.66) (-2.77) (-2.90) (-3.09) (-2.41) (-3.80)
SLOPE EUR 0.0359 -0.0002 0.1464* 0.0353 0.0196 0.0962
(0.72) (-0.00) (1.74) (0.52) (0.21) (0.93)
O/N SPREAD USD -0.3949** 0.2389* -1.3315*** -0.3408 -0.0427 -1.0397***
(-2.81) (1.74) (-4.23) (-1.70) (-0.18) (-2.83)
O/N SPREAD EUR 0.2905*** 0.5729*** 0.2035** 0.4028*** 0.6490*** 0.4054***
(5.09) (5.51) (2.31) (5.89) (6.16) (3.90)
CONSTANT 0.6626*** 1.1258*** 0.6634*** 0.8072*** 1.2133*** 0.9657***
(6.59) (8.52) (3.59) (5.73) (6.78) (4.41)
Within-R2 0.050 0.056 0.029 0.068 0.064 0.034
N 8,086 8,086 8,086 8,086 8,086 8,086
66
TABLE 8
Panel Difference-in-Differences Specification for Liquidity Variables Using D2C or D2D Trades.
Table 8 shows estimation results of equation (6), where the treatment group are the USD
mandated contracts and the control group are the USD non-mandated contracts. The liquidity
metrics are defined in equations (1)–(5) but the measures are constructed from either
dealer-to-client (first three columns) or dealer-to-dealer (last three columns) trade prices.
DATE(1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the introduction of SEF trading on
Oct. 2, 2013 and DATE(2) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the mandate
effective dates as per Table 1. MAT is a dummy that takes the value 1 for mandated contracts,
and 0 otherwise. SWAP RV is the daily maturity/currency-specific realized variance of each swap
contract calculated using a 30-day rolling window. VIX and VDAX are the S&P 500 and DAX
volatility indices and logRSP500 and logRDAX are the daily log returns on the indices themselves.
O/N SPREAD USD and O/N SPREAD EUR are the differences between the overnight
unsecured borrowing rates and the respective central bank rates. SLOPE USD and SLOPE EUR
are the spreads between the 10-year and 3-month government securities of the United States and
the investment grade Eurozone countries respectively. Standard errors are clustered by maturity.
Robust t-statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively. The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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TABLE 8 (continued)
USD mandated vs. USD non-mandated - Liquidity variables
D2C D2D
DISP VW DISP JNS DISP BZ DISP VW DISP JNS DISP BZ
DATE(1) -0.1757*** -0.2757*** -0.1961** -0.2378*** -0.3557*** -0.3111***
(-5.63) (-4.40) (-2.70) (-4.58) (-10.16) (-3.75)
MAT × DATE(1) 0.0134 0.0264 -0.0198 0.0342 0.0843* 0.0338
(0.37) (0.37) (-0.30) (0.61) (2.14) (0.40)
DATE(2) 0.0447 -0.0233 0.0983* -0.0618* -0.0448 -0.0239
(1.63) (-0.67) (1.81) (-2.07) (-1.03) (-0.40)
MAT × DATE(2) -0.0713*** -0.0393 -0.1108* -0.0064 -0.0402 -0.0739
(-4.50) (-1.59) (-2.10) (-0.21) (-0.82) (-1.35)
SWAP RV 7.7447 6.1456 38.8071*** -0.9503 5.4553 3.1516
(1.22) (0.68) (3.32) (-0.11) (0.35) (0.20)
VIX 0.0104 0.0090 0.0209 0.0086* 0.0045 0.0200*
(1.67) (1.65) (1.49) (1.80) (0.99) (1.88)
VDAX 0.0176** 0.0267*** 0.0254* 0.0205*** 0.0351*** 0.0252**
(2.69) (4.29) (2.13) (3.73) (4.12) (2.24)
logRSP500 -3.7757** -3.8327* -7.4619** -5.4071*** -4.0018** -10.6833***
(-2.73) (-2.14) (-2.24) (-4.94) (-2.20) (-4.62)
logRDAX 0.4674 -0.1334 1.2727 1.4733** -0.3310 4.8861***
(0.50) (-0.12) (0.79) (2.73) (-0.29) (3.95)
SLOPE USD -0.1193*** -0.1956*** -0.1436* -0.2032*** -0.2575*** -0.2880***
(-4.15) (-5.36) (-1.86) (-5.38) (-4.70) (-4.11)
SLOPE EUR 0.0913 0.0726 0.1983* 0.1680*** 0.1799** 0.2756**
(1.69) (1.04) (2.03) (3.19) (2.87) (2.57)
O/N SPREAD USD -0.2546 -0.2468 -0.7301* -0.0251 -0.4298 -0.3192
(-1.59) (-1.51) (-1.98) (-0.13) (-1.55) (-0.85)
O/N SPREAD EUR 0.2419*** 0.4442*** 0.2265* 0.4794*** 0.5890*** 0.6621***
(3.60) (4.67) (1.77) (6.05) (7.06) (5.10)
CONSTANT 0.4960*** 0.9949*** 0.3963 0.6464*** 0.9113*** 0.8199**
(3.67) (4.82) (1.60) (3.84) (4.01) (2.89)
Within-R2 0.063 0.064 0.047 0.090 0.084 0.057
N 5,329 5,329 5,329 5,329 5,329 5,329
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TABLE 10
Activity Panel Regressions Utilizing the SEF Variable.
Table 10 shows the estimation results of specification (10) for USD and EUR-denominated
mandated contracts and where activity variables are the dependent ones. VLM is the amount of
gross notional traded in U.S. dollars, NTRADES is the number of trades executed and
NPARTIES is the number of unique counterparties active on a given day. SEF is the percent of
the total trading volume executed on a SEF, DATE(1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 after the introduction of SEF trading (Oct. 2, 2013), SWAP RV is the daily
maturity/currency-specific realized variance of each swap contract calculated using a 30-day
rolling window, VIX and VDAX are the S&P 500 and DAX volatility indices and logRSP500 and
logRDAX are the daily log returns on the indices themselves. O/N SPREAD USD and
O/N SPREAD EUR are the differences between the overnight unsecured borrowing rates and the
respective central bank rates. SLOPE USD and SLOPE EUR are the spreads between the 10-year
and 3-month government securities of the United States and the investment grade Eurozone
countries respectively. The model is estimated using maturity and currency fixed effects. We
report 2 sets of results: (i) fixed effects specifications (FE) and (ii) instrumental variable fixed
effects specifications (FE&IV), where SEF is treated as endogenous and is instrumented using
own lags. Standard errors are clustered by maturity and currency. Robust t-statistics are shown
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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TABLE 10 (continued)
VLM VLM NTRADES NTRADES NPARTIES NPARTIES
SEF 1.0991** 3.5368*** 12.5107** 36.0019*** 1.1922** 1.0802
(2.39) (6.00) (2.46) (5.92) (2.37) (1.20)
DATE(1) -0.1474 -1.5360*** -6.6839** -20.3018*** -0.9629** -0.8962
(-0.83) (-3.98) (-2.55) (-5.11) (-2.69) (-1.52)
SWAP RV -23.0222 52.3171 -486.6971 186.9327 -159.5672 -193.2745***
(-0.20) (1.08) (-0.51) (0.37) (-0.83) (-2.61)
VIX -0.0002 -0.0135 0.6743* 0.4919 0.0693 0.0403
(-0.01) (-0.31) (1.94) (1.08) (1.22) (0.60)
VDAX 0.1266*** 0.1226*** 1.1320*** 1.0597** 0.2241*** 0.2593***
(3.52) (2.71) (2.92) (2.27) (3.53) (3.76)
logRSP500 -6.3167 -16.0204* -30.8376 -134.0619 2.0093 -6.4599
(-1.32) (-1.92) (-0.61) (-1.55) (0.30) (-0.51)
logRDAX -3.3225 -2.2498 -116.5080* -99.9945* -9.8547 -9.5957
(-0.76) (-0.38) (-1.92) (-1.65) (-1.35) (-1.07)
SLOPE USD -0.6096 -0.6815** -7.0445* -9.0652*** 0.3229 0.5465
(-1.35) (-2.37) (-1.73) (-3.06) (0.47) (1.25)
SLOPE EUR 1.9408*** 2.4542*** 14.4390*** 20.5942*** 1.2597 1.2872***
(3.81) (7.84) (3.15) (6.38) (1.58) (2.70)
O/N SPREAD USD -0.8207 0.3127 -2.2228 3.8232 -0.5797 2.1097
(-0.69) (0.16) (-0.19) (0.19) (-0.19) (0.72)
O/N SPREAD EUR 2.1873*** 2.4904*** 27.8625*** 32.3748*** 2.9634*** 3.1571***
(3.88) (4.82) (3.85) (6.08) (3.40) (4.01)
CONSTANT 2.5937* 2.2338*** 42.7607*** 42.8665*** 17.7379*** 17.7182***
(1.90) (2.78) (3.37) (5.18) (12.67) (14.47)
Within-R2 0.0273 0.0122 0.0272 0.0151 0.0237 0.0256
N 7795 7074 7795 7074 7795 7074
Specification FE IV&FE FE IV&FE FE IV&FE
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TABLE 11
Difference-in-Differences Regressions of the Number of Unique Dealers per Client.
Table 11 shows the estimation results of model (11). NDEALERSit is the number of unique
dealers with whom client i trades in month t. DATE
(1)
t is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 after the introduction of SEF trading (Oct. 2, 2013) and DATE
(2)
t is the Feb. 2014 mandated
trading dummy. U Si is a dummy for clients that are U.S. legal entities and ACTIVEi is a dummy
for clients who trade more than 20 times a month (on average). VLMit, NTRADESit and
NCONTRACTSit are the volume traded (in £billions), the number of trades executed and the
number of different contracts traded respectively by client i in month t. The model is estimated
using client ID fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by client ID. Robust t-statistics are
shown in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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TABLE 11 (continued)
NDEALERS NDEALERS
DATE(1) 0.3557* 0.1572
(1.94) (1.04)
DATE(2) -0.0161 0.0965
(-0.06) (0.46)
U S×DATE(1) 0.1904 0.1875
(0.59) (0.68)
U S×DATE(2) -0.6695 -0.7345*
(-1.44) (-1.92)
ACTIVE 3.6733*** 1.9699***
(8.28) (5.85)
DATE(1)×ACTIVE -0.0479 0.3396
(-0.18) (1.58)
DATE(2)×ACTIVE 0.0066 -0.2495
(0.02) (-0.74)
U S×ACTIVE 0.6325 0.6239
(0.95) (1.17)
U S×DATE(1)×ACTIVE -0.3178 -0.2169
(-0.59) (-0.49)
U S×DATE(2)×ACTIVE 1.5754*** 1.8168***
(2.62) (3.29)
NTRADES 0.0064***
(5.83)
VLM 0.2022
(0.25)
NCONTRACTS 0.4966***
(14.94)
CONSTANT 5.3342*** 2.7448***
(37.99) (13.32)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Within-R2 0.280 0.472
N 2633 2633
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TABLE 12
Time Series Regressions of the Percentage of U.S.-to-non-U.S. Volume.
Table 12 shows the estimation results of time series regressions of the percentage of
U.S.-to-non-U.S. volume in the USD and EUR-denominated contracts. DATE(1) is a time dummy
that takes the value 1 after the introduction of SEF trading on Oct. 2, 2013, AVG SWAP RV is
the daily cross-maturity average currency-specific swap realized variance calculated using a 30-day
rolling window, logRSP500 and logRDAX are the daily log returns of the S&P 500 and DAX
indices and VIX and VDAX are estimates of the implied volatility of these indices.
O/N SPREAD USD and O/N SPREAD EUR are the differences between the overnight
unsecured borrowing rates and the respective central bank rates. SLOPE USD and SLOPE EUR
are the spreads between the 10-year and 3-month government securities of the United States and
the investment grade Eurozone countries respectively. Robust t-statistics are shown in the
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The
time period is Jan. 1, 2013 to Sept. 15, 2014.
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TABLE 12 (continued)
U.S.-to-non U.S., % U.S.-to-non U.S., % U.S.-to-non U.S., % U.S.-to-non U.S., %
(USD) (EUR - All) (EUR - D2D) (EUR - D2C & C2C)
DATE(1) 0.0140 -0.1685*** -0.1669*** -0.0009
(0.89) (-9.40) (-9.47) (-0.13)
AVG SWAP RV -19.1248 -3.0357 -9.2632* 6.3420
(-0.89) (-0.46) (-1.78) (1.33)
VIX 0.0002 0.0011 0.0037 -0.0027*
(0.08) (0.36) (1.30) (-1.88)
VDAX 0.0043 -0.0017 -0.0050 0.0036**
(1.40) (-0.51) (-1.56) (2.28)
logRSP500 -0.4936 0.5239 0.7324 -0.2146
(-0.78) (0.84) (1.27) (-0.79)
logRDAX 0.1700 -0.3264 -0.1077 -0.2103
(0.37) (-0.82) (-0.29) (-1.27)
SLOPE USD -0.0052 0.0059 0.0367 -0.0308**
(-0.16) (0.22) (1.50) (-2.41)
SLOPE EUR 0.0245 0.0251 0.0028 0.0226*
(0.76) (1.08) (0.13) (1.86)
O/N SPREAD USD 0.1027 -0.2739 -0.2029 -0.0709
(0.52) (-1.41) (-1.34) (-0.67)
O/N SPREAD EUR -0.0764 -0.0609 -0.0728** 0.0106
(-1.63) (-1.62) (-2.35) (0.56)
CONSTANT 0.3749*** 0.1589*** 0.1078* 0.0469
(5.60) (2.61) (1.88) (1.47)
R2 0.080 0.744 0.745 0.153
N 285 285 285 285
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